Daftar Harga Haji Bersama Mamah Dedeh di Jakarta Selatan
Daftar Harga Haji Bersama Mamah Dedeh di Jakarta Selatan Hubungi 021-9929-2337 atau 0821-2406-5740 Alhijaz Indowisata adalah perusahaan swasta nasional yang bergerak di bidang tour dan travel. Nama Alhijaz terinspirasi dari istilah dua kota suci bagi umat islam pada zaman nabi Muhammad saw. yaitu Makkah dan Madinah. Dua kota yang penuh berkah sehingga diharapkan menular dalam kinerja perusahaan. Sedangkan Indowisata merupakan akronim dari kata indo yang berarti negara Indonesia dan wisata yang menjadi fokus usaha bisnis kami.
Daftar Harga Haji Bersama Mamah Dedeh di Jakarta Selatan Alhijaz Indowisata didirikan oleh Bapak H. Abdullah Djakfar Muksen pada tahun 2010. Merangkak dari kecil namun pasti, alhijaz berkembang pesat dari mulai penjualan tiket maskapai penerbangan domestik dan luar negeri, tour domestik hingga mengembangkan ke layanan jasa umrah dan haji khusus. Tak hanya itu, pada tahun 2011 Alhijaz kembali membuka divisi baru yaitu provider visa umrah yang bekerja sama dengan muassasah arab saudi. Sebagai komitmen legalitas perusahaan dalam melayani pelanggan dan jamaah secara aman dan profesional, saat ini perusahaan telah mengantongi izin resmi dari pemerintah melalui kementrian pariwisata, lalu izin haji khusus dan umrah dari kementrian agama. Selain itu perusahaan juga tergabung dalam komunitas organisasi travel nasional seperti Asita, komunitas penyelenggara umrah dan haji khusus yaitu HIMPUH dan organisasi internasional yaitu IATA.
Saco-Indonesia.com - Serangan stroke dapat terjadi tiba-tiba, namun tanda-tandanya sebenarnya
dapat dideteksi. Para ahli menga
Saco-
Indonesia.com - Serangan stroke dapat terjadi tiba-tiba, namun tanda-tandanya sebenarnya
dapat dideteksi. Para ahli mengatakan, semakin dini stroke dikenali dan diobati, maka semakin
besar kemungkinan untuk sembuh dan terhindar dari risiko kelumpuhan.
Mati rasa
pada wajah, lengan, kaki di satu sisi tubuh, disertai kebingungan dan masalah berbicara merupakan
tanda-tanda seseorang mengalami stroke. Selain itu, ada pula tanda-tanda seperti pusing dan sakit
kepala parah, mengalami masalah berjalan, hilang penglihatan di satu atau kedua mata.
Kepala Divisi Stroke di NewYork-Presbyterian Hospital/Columbia University Medical
Center mengatakan, ketika seseorang terkena stroke, mereka akan menunjukkan tanda-tanda perubahan
fisik yang dapat dikenali, ringan ataupun ekstrem.
Berikut adalah
beberapa tanda yang perlu diwaspadai :
1. Tiba-tiba mati rasa atau
lemah pada bagian wajah, lengan, atau kaki - terutama pada satu sisi tubuh.
Orang dengan stroke biasanya akan memiliki bentuk mulut "tidak rata" alias
mencong. Perlu diwaspadai juga apabila mereka (orang yang dicurigai stroke) mengalami kesulitan
menggerakkan lengan atau mengendalikan jari. Misalnya, ketika mengangkat kedua tangan, tangan
yang sebelah lebih tinggi dibandingkan tangan yang lain.
2. Tiba-tiba
kebingungan dan kesulitan berbicara.
Masalah bahasa adalah salah satu
tanda-tanda yang paling umum dari stroke. Seseorang yang mengalami stroke tiba-tiba mungkin akan
mengalami masalah ketika mereka bicara. Bahkan, beberapa di antaranya juga mengalami penurunan
pemahaman. Mintalah dia (orang yang dicurigai stroke) untuk mengulangi kembali kalimat sederhana
kepada Anda, misalnya: "Saya pergi ke toko hari ini." Jika ia mengalami kesulitan
mengulangi kata-kata itu bisa jadi dia mengalami stroke.
3.
Pengelihatan mendadak terganggu.
Gangguan pengelihatan yang datang
secara tiba-tiba merupakan gejala stroke yang umum. Mereka mungkin tidak akan mampu melihat
dengan jelas dengan satu mata, atau mungkin mengalami kesulitan untuk melihat ke kanan atau
kiri.
4. Tiba-tiba kesulitan berjalan, kehilangankeseimbangan atau koordinasi.
Berjalan seolah-olah mabuk,
tersandung, atau bahkan jatuh adalah semua gejala stroke. Tanda-tanda serupa lainnya seperti
berjalan dengan kaki terbuka lebar atau tiba-tiba kehilangan kemampuan motorik halus, seperti
ketidakmampuan untuk menulis juga patut diwaspadai.
5. Sakit kepala
parah tiba-tiba tanpa diketahui penyebabnya.
Gangguan sakit kepala tidak
selalu identik dengan gejala stroke. Tetapi, jika sakit kepala menyerang tiba-tiba atau tampak
sangat intens, patut untuk diwaspadai. Jika leher kaku, nyeri pada wajah, atau muntah yang
disertai sakit kepala bukan tidak mungkin akan menyebabkan terjadinya perdarahan intrakranial,
juga dikenal sebagai "stroke merah (red sroke)."
Pencegahan
Pengobatan dini dapat mencegah
kerusakan yang lebih besar akibat stroke. Salah satu pengobatan umum stroke yaitu dengan
tissue plasminogen activator (TPA). Obat ini disuntikkan ke arteri atau vena yang kemudian
akan melarutkan sumbatan di pembuluh darah sehingga darah kembali mengalir ke otak.
Stroke merupakan penyakit pemicu kematian yang serius, namun sebenarnya dapat dicegah.
Perubahan gaya hidup perlu ditingkatkan guna mengurangi risiko stroke. Berikut beberapa perubahan
gaya hidup yang dapat dilakukan :
- Kurangi garam
Mengurangi konsumsi garam dapat menurunkan tekanan darah sehingga mengurangi risiko
stroke.
- Konsumsi makanan sehat
Kurangi
kolesterol "jahat" dapat meningkatkan kesehatan jantung dan mengurangi risiko stroke.
Kadar kolesterol harus di bawah 200 mg/dL.
- Stop merokok
Perokok memiliki risiko stroke dua kali lipat. Merokok dapat merusak pembuluh
darah dan meningkatkan tekanan darah, serta mempercepat penyumbatan di pembuluh darah.
- Hidup aktif dan olahraga
Orang yang kelebihan
berat badan atau obesitas memiliki risiko yang lebih besar memiliki kadar kolesterol tinggi,
hipertensi, diabetes, dan stroke. Olahraga dapat mengurangi berat badan sehingga mengurangi
risiko penyakit-penyakit tersebut.
Meskipun telah mengubah gaya hidup, para
ahli mengatakan orang yang berusia di atas 55 tahun memiliki risiko yang lebih besar terkena
stroke. Selain itu, meskipun stroke lebih umum terjadi di kalangan kaum Adam, namun wanita pun
tak terlepas dari risikonya.
Sumber :Healthday News
Editor : Liwon Maulana(galipat)
PESERTA FORMULA 1 UNGKAPKAN NOMOR BALAP
saco-indonesia.com, Para pebalap Formula 1 tampaknya telah menghabiskan musim dingin dengan memilih-milih nomor balap yang akan
saco-indonesia.com, Para pebalap Formula 1 tampaknya telah menghabiskan musim dingin dengan memilih-milih nomor balap yang akan mereka gunakan hingga akhir karirnya nanti.
Seperti yang telah diumumkan oleh Federasi Balap Mobil Internasional (FIA) pekan lalu, mulai musim depan para pebalap F1 telah diperbolehkan untuk memilih nomor balapnya sendiri, dari nomor 2 hingga 99. FIA juga telah meminta para pebalap untuk dapat mengirimkan tiga nomor pilihan mereka.
Pebalap Force India, Sergio Perez juga telah mengumumkan bahwa ia menginginkan nomor 11. Sementara pebalap Scuderia Ferrari, Fernando Alonso dikabarkan ingin memakai nomor 14.
Pebalap Toro Rosso, Jean-Eric Vergne dan pebalap Mercedes, Nico Rosberg masing-masing ingin memakai nomor 27 dan nomor 6. Sementara pebalap Williams, Valtteri Bottas ingin memakai nomor 77. Rekan setimnya, Felipe Massa juga telah mengumumkan via Twitter bahwa dirinya akan menggunakan nomor 19.
Meski begitu ada beberapa pebalap yang tak ingin mengungkapkan nomornya, seperti Daniel Ricciardo, Daniil Kvyat dan Romain Grosjean. "Saat ini, saya juga harus merahasiakannya. Namun sangat menyenangkan para pebalap F1 akhirnya telah diperbolehkan memilih nomor sendiri mulai tahun depan," ujar Ricciardo yang akan membela Red Bull Racing.
Pebalap Scuderia Ferrari, Kimi Raikkonen dikabarkan akan memakai nomor 7, namun sang juara dunia 2014, Sebastian Vettel belum dapat memastikan nomor balapnya musim depan.
Editor : Dian Sukmawati
Marcel Pronovost, 84, Dies; Hall of Famer Shared in Five N.H.L. Titles
Pronovost, who played for the Red Wings, was not a prolific scorer, but he was a consummate team player with bruising checks and fearless bursts up the ice that could puncture a defense.
Ex-C.I.A. Official Rebuts Republican Claims on Benghazi Attack in The Great War of Our Time
WASHINGTON — The former deputy director of the C.I.A. asserts in a forthcoming book that Republicans, in their eagerness to politicize the killing of the American ambassador to Libya, repeatedly distorted the agency’s analysis of events. But he also argues that the C.I.A. should get out of the business of providing “talking points” for administration officials in national security events that quickly become partisan, as happened after the Benghazi attack in 2012.
The official, Michael J. Morell, dismisses the allegation that the United States military and C.I.A. officers “were ordered to stand down and not come to the rescue of their comrades,” and he says there is “no evidence” to support the charge that “there was a conspiracy between C.I.A. and the White House to spin the Benghazi story in a way that would protect the political interests of the president and Secretary Clinton,” referring to the secretary of state at the time, Hillary Rodham Clinton.
But he also concludes that the White House itself embellished some of the talking points provided by the Central Intelligence Agency and had blocked him from sending an internal study of agency conclusions to Congress.
“I finally did so without asking,” just before leaving government, he writes, and after the White House released internal emails to a committee investigating the State Department’s handling of the issue.
A lengthy congressional investigation remains underway, one that many Republicans hope to use against Mrs. Clinton in the 2016 election cycle.
In parts of the book, “The Great War of Our Time” (Twelve), Mr. Morell praises his C.I.A. colleagues for many successes in stopping terrorist attacks, but he is surprisingly critical of other C.I.A. failings — and those of the National Security Agency.
Soon after Mr. Morell retired in 2013 after 33 years in the agency, President Obama appointed him to a commission reviewing the actions of the National Security Agency after the disclosures of Edward J. Snowden, a former intelligence contractor who released classified documents about the government’s eavesdropping abilities. Mr. Morell writes that he was surprised by what he found.
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“You would have thought that of all the government entities on the planet, the one least vulnerable to such grand theft would have been the N.S.A.,” he writes. “But it turned out that the N.S.A. had left itself vulnerable.”
He concludes that most Wall Street firms had better cybersecurity than the N.S.A. had when Mr. Snowden swept information from its systems in 2013. While he said he found himself “chagrined by how well the N.S.A. was doing” compared with the C.I.A. in stepping up its collection of data on intelligence targets, he also sensed that the N.S.A., which specializes in electronic spying, was operating without considering the implications of its methods.
“The N.S.A. had largely been collecting information because it could, not necessarily in all cases because it should,” he says.
Mr. Morell was a career analyst who rose through the ranks of the agency, and he ended up in the No. 2 post. He served as President George W. Bush’s personal intelligence briefer in the first months of his presidency — in those days, he could often be spotted at the Starbucks in Waco, Tex., catching up on his reading — and was with him in the schoolhouse in Florida on the morning of Sept. 11, 2001, when the Bush presidency changed in an instant.
Mr. Morell twice took over as acting C.I.A. director, first when Leon E. Panetta was appointed secretary of defense and then when retired Gen. David H. Petraeus resigned over an extramarital affair with his biographer, a relationship that included his handing her classified notes of his time as America’s best-known military commander.
Mr. Morell says he first learned of the affair from Mr. Petraeus only the night before he resigned, and just as the Benghazi events were turning into a political firestorm. While praising Mr. Petraeus, who had told his deputy “I am very lucky” to run the C.I.A., Mr. Morell writes that “the organization did not feel the same way about him.” The former general “created the impression through the tone of his voice and his body language that he did not want people to disagree with him (which was not true in my own interaction with him),” he says.
But it is his account of the Benghazi attacks — and how the C.I.A. was drawn into the debate over whether the Obama White House deliberately distorted its account of the death of Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens — that is bound to attract attention, at least partly because of its relevance to the coming presidential election. The initial assessments that the C.I.A. gave to the White House said demonstrations had preceded the attack. By the time analysts reversed their opinion, Susan E. Rice, now the national security adviser, had made a series of statements on Sunday talk shows describing the initial assessment. The controversy and other comments Ms. Rice made derailed Mr. Obama’s plan to appoint her as secretary of state.
The experience prompted Mr. Morell to write that the C.I.A. should stay out of the business of preparing talking points — especially on issues that are being seized upon for “political purposes.” He is critical of the State Department for not beefing up security in Libya for its diplomats, as the C.I.A., he said, did for its employees.
But he concludes that the assault in which the ambassador was killed took place “with little or no advance planning” and “was not well organized.” He says the attackers “did not appear to be looking for Americans to harm. They appeared intent on looting and conducting some vandalism,” setting fires that killed Mr. Stevens and a security official, Sean Smith.
Mr. Morell paints a picture of an agency that was struggling, largely unsuccessfully, to understand dynamics in the Middle East and North Africa when the Arab Spring broke out in late 2011 in Tunisia. The agency’s analysts failed to see the forces of revolution coming — and then failed again, he writes, when they told Mr. Obama that the uprisings would undercut Al Qaeda by showing there was a democratic pathway to change.
“There is no good explanation for our not being able to see the pressures growing to dangerous levels across the region,” he writes. The agency had again relied too heavily “on a handful of strong leaders in the countries of concern to help us understand what was going on in the Arab street,” he says, and those leaders themselves were clueless.
Moreover, an agency that has always overvalued secretly gathered intelligence and undervalued “open source” material “was not doing enough to mine the wealth of information available through social media,” he writes. “We thought and told policy makers that this outburst of popular revolt would damage Al Qaeda by undermining the group’s narrative,” he writes.
Instead, weak governments in Egypt, and the absence of governance from Libya to Yemen, were “a boon to Islamic extremists across both the Middle East and North Africa.”
Mr. Morell is gentle about most of the politicians he dealt with — he expresses admiration for both Mr. Bush and Mr. Obama, though he accuses former Vice President Dick Cheney of deliberately implying a connection between Al Qaeda and Iraq that the C.I.A. had concluded probably did not exist. But when it comes to the events leading up to the Bush administration’s decision to go to war in Iraq, he is critical of his own agency.
Mr. Morell concludes that the Bush White House did not have to twist intelligence on Saddam Hussein’s alleged effort to rekindle the country’s work on weapons of mass destruction.
“The view that hard-liners in the Bush administration forced the intelligence community into its position on W.M.D. is just flat wrong,” he writes. “No one pushed. The analysts were already there and they had been there for years, long before Bush came to office.”